# 참고문헌 * 노형식(2019). “우리나라 비은행 금융중개 현황과 정책과제.” 예금보험공사 금융리스트리뷰 2019년 봄 * 신용상. 「국내 부동산 그림자금융 현황과 업권별 리스크 관리방안」.KIF VIP 리포트 2019-05. 한국금융연구원, 2019. * 오승곤이〮동익박〮가현(2019). “국내 비은행금융중개 리스크 요인 분석 및 시사점, “ KDIC 조사분석정보, 2019.11. * 한국은행(2014). “글로벌 금융위기 이후 금융규제 개혁 논의, “ 2014.6.한국은행, 금융안정보고서, 각호 * Acharya, Viral V., Lasse H. Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and Matthew Richardson (2010), “Measuring Systemic Risk,” Working Paper, New York University. * Adrian, T., and H.S. Shin (2008), “Liquidity and financial contagion” Banque de France Financial Stability Review: Special Isuues on Liquidity 11, pp.1\~7. * Adrian, T., and H.S. Shin (2010), “The changing nature of financial intermediation and the financial crisis of 2007-09.” Annual Review of Economics. Vol.2, pp.603\~618. * Allen, Franklin, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2006). “Beauty Contests and Iterated Expecteations in Asset Markets,” Review of Financial Studies. * Brunnermeier, M. and L. Pedersen (2009), “Market Iiquidity and funding Iiquidity,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, 2009, pp. 2001-2238. * Caruana, J. (2010), “Systemic ristk: how to deal with it?,” BIS * Chousakos, Gorton and Ordonez (2020), “ The Macroprudential Role of Stock Markets,” Working Paper * Dalio, Ray (2018), Principles for Navigation Big Debt Crises, Wertport, CT, Bridegewater * Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmstrom (2018), “Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises,” Worings Paper, Yale University. * Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmstrom (2013), “ Hairscuts and Repo Chains,” working paper. * Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmstrom Guillermo Ordonez (2017), “Banks as Secret Keepers,” American Economic Review (2017) 107, 1005-1029. * DeLong, J.B., A. Shleifer, L. Summers, and R. Wladman (1990), “Positive feedback investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculation” Jourmal of Finance 45 * Finanacial Times (2020), “The seeds of the next debt crisis,” 2020.3.4. (by John Plender) * Froot Kenneth A., David D. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C, Stein (1992), “Herd on the street: Informational inefficiencies in a markert with short-term speculaiton” journal of Finanace 47 * FSB (2015), Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report, 2015. * FSB (2015), Developing Effective Reculution Strategies and Plans for Systemically Improtant Insurers, Consultative Document, 2015. * FSB (2020), Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Inermediation 2020. * FSB, IMF, BIS (2009), Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markerts and Instruments: Initial Considerations, Report to G20 finance ministers and governors, 2009. * Gorton, G. and G. Ordoñez (2014), “Collateral Crises,” American Economic Review * Gorton, G. and A. Metrick (2010), “Regulating the Shadow Banking System,” Working Paper, Available at SSRN: * Greenbaum, S., A. Thakor and A. Boot (2019), Contemporary Financial Intermediation 4th Edition, Academic Press * Haldane, A. (2009), “Why banks failed the stress test?”, speech at the Marcus-Evans conference on stress testing, 9-10 February. * Hahm, J-H and F. S. Mishikin (2000), “The Korean Financial Crisis: an Asymmetric Information Perspective”, Emerging Markets Review, 1 * Holmström, Bengt (2015), “Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System,” BIS Working Papers, No. 479. * IMF (2019) “Global Financial Stability Report”, Oct. 2019 * Lee, In Ho (1998), “Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches”, Review of Economic Studies 65, pp. 741-759. * Perraudin, William and Wu, Shi, “Determinants of Asset-Backed Security Prices in Crisis Periods,” Working Paper, 2008. * Pozsar, Zoltan, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, “Shadow Banking,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 458, 2010 * Vives, Xavier, “The crisis, information, and the market,” VOX column, May 2008, Available at * Barth, James R. & Michael G, Bradley, “The Ailing S & Ls: Causes and Cures,” in *Challenge* (March. 1989). Pp. 30-38. * Benston, George J, Gerald A. Hanweck, and David B. Humphrey, “Scale Economics in Banking : A Restructuring and Reassessment,” *Journal of Money, Cridit and Banking, 14*(Nov. 1982), 435-56. * Benston, George J., “The Regulation of Financial Services,” in George J. Benston ed., *Financial Services : The Changing Institutions And Government Poliy*, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1984).pp. 28-63. * B.I.S., *60th Annual Report* (Basle, 1990) * Bloch, Ernest, *Inside Investment Banking,* (Homewood, Dow Jones-Irwin, 1989) * Havrilesky, Thomas M., *Contemporary Developments in Financial Institutions And Markets*, (Arlington Heights, Harlan Davidson, 1983) * Henning, Charles N., *Financial Markets And the Economy*, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1989) * Kamphuis, Robert W. (eds.), *Black Monday and the Future of Financial Markets*, (Homewood, IL, DOW Jones-Irwin, Inc., 1989) * Kaufman, George G., *The U.S. Financial System: Money, Markets, And Institutions*, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1989) * 강병호ᆞ김대식ᆞ박경서, 『금융기관론』, 제21개정판, 박영사, 2016 * 권재중 외, 『금융기관론』, 제3판, 청람, 2016 * 금융감독원, 『금융감독개론』, 2018 * 금융위원회, 『금융회사 지배구조 선진화 방안』, 2013 * 금융위원회 KDI, 『2012 경제발전경험모듈화사업: 예금보험제도』, 2013 * 김종현, 『핀테크 3.0 핀테크 혁명과 금융의 미래』, 한국금융연수원, 2015 * 김홍기, 『금융위기 이후 주요국의 투자은행업무 규제동향과 우리나라에서의 시사점』, 2011 * 김홍범ᆞ정운찬, 『화폐와 금융시장』, 제5판, 율곡출판사, 2018 * 신보성, 『글로벌 금융규제 흐름과 우리나라 금융규제개혁의 바람직한 방향』, 2014 * 예금보험공사, 『연차보고서』, 2017 * 예금보험공사, 『주요국 금융안정망 체계 및 시사점』, 2018 * 원동욱, 『세계금융위기 이후 주요국의 금융기관 지배구조』, 2011 * 윤종문, 『모바일 지급결제기술의 현황 및 전망』, 2015 * 정운찬ᆞ송홍선, 『예금보험론』, 2007 * 한국은행, 『한국의 거시건전성정책』, 2015 * 한국은행, 『1950년 한국은행 창립 이후 대한민국의 화폐』, 2010 * BCBS, 『Sound Practices : Implications of fintech developments form banks and bank supervisors』, 2018 * Berger Molyneux Wilson, 『The Oxford Handbook of Banking』, 2015 * BIS, 『Implications of Repo Markets for Central Banks』, CGFS paper, No. 10, 1999 * Cassis Grossman Schenk, 『The Oxford Handbook of Banking and Financial History』, 2016 * ECB, 『Euro Repo Markets and the Financial Turmoil』, Monthly Bulletin, Feb 2010 * F. Allen and D. Gale, 『Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies, Journal of Financial Intermediation, pp. 68\~89』, 1999 * FSB, 『Financial Stability Implications from Fintech : Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Meri Authorities’ Attention』, 2017 * Goodhart, 김홍법 옮김, 『중앙은행의 진화 (the evolution of central banks)』, 1997 * Goodhart, C. Hartmann. P. Llewellyn, Rojas-Suavez, L and Weishrod, S., 『Financial Regulation : Why, how and where now?』, 1998 * GOV.UK, 『Independent Commission on Banking : Final report』, 2011 * IADI, 『Deposit Insurance Surveys : IADI Annual Survey 2016』, 2016 * Ross Levine, 『Finance and Growth : Theory and Evidence, NBER Working Paper No. 10766』, 2004 * World Bank, 『World Development Report 2002 : Building Institutions for Markets』, 2001 * We use the general term digital asset rather than cryptocurrency, virtual currency, or cryptoasset. Terms may have distinct legal meanings in certain jurisdictions. * . Increasing digital asset prices contributed to this rise, but organic growth was also very strong. The number of DeFi wallets grew from 100,000 to 1.2 million during 2020, and new DeFi applications went from eight in 2019 to over 230 in 2020. Exclusive: DeFi Year in Review by DappRadar, The Defiant (December 28, 2020), . * See. e,g., Tobias Adrian, John Kiff, and Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity, Leverage, and Regulation 10 Years After the Global Financial Crisis, Annual Review of Financial Economics 10:1-24 (2018). * See e.g. Laurence Fletcher, Hedge funds rethink after GameStop pain, Financial Times (April 14, 2021), * Nat Maddrey, Ethereum's DeFi Evolution: How DeFi is Fueling Ethereum's Growth, Coin Metrics (September 29, 2020), . * Some efforts are underway to catalog and categorize the DeFi landscape, including the ConsenSys DeFi Score () and Codefi Inspect(). These use slightly different definitions of DeFi than the one presented here. * Fred Ehrsam, Blockchain Tokens and the Dawn of the Decentralized Business Model, Coinbase Blog, August 1, 2016, . * Olga Kharif, Hedge Funds Flip ICOs, Leaving Other Investors Holding the Bag, Bloomberg (October 3, 2017), ; * 2021 Digital Asset Outlook Report, The Block Research, . * Ethereum is in the midst of transitioning to a new version, Eth2, which promises significant scalability improvements, including replacing energy-intensive proof of work mining with proof of stake. The Eth2 Upgrades: Upgrading Ethereum to Radical New Heights, Ethereum Foundation, . * We use the term credit for borrowing and lending relationships broadly, rather than in the technical sense of money creation. In contrast to CeFi bank loans, where the borrowing process is separate from the pooling of capital to fund it, DeFi services can provide both sides simultaneously, often targeting the same users.